Dangerous Thoughts
A Civic Letter on Corporate Taxation • No. 03 in the Series

Who Pays
for a Person

Before 1981 the tax code carried a quiet assumption — that money a company spent on its people was not the same thing as profit. It was never generosity. It was arithmetic with a conscience.
52.8%
Peak U.S. corporate tax rate, 1968–69 — the highest it has ever been
28¢ → 10¢
Corporate share of every federal dollar, the 1950s to today
10.4M
Full-time workers on Medicaid or food aid in one recent year
By Orion Quin  ·  Dangerous Thoughts  ·  June 2026
§00   The Premise

Every Ledger Has a Philosophy

We are taught to read a tax code the way we read a thermostat — a technical thing, a dial of rates and brackets, nothing in it to believe in or to doubt. This is a small lie of convenience. The moment a society decides what counts as profit, it has decided, quietly, what it is for. A code that taxes what a company keeps and leaves untouched what it pays out to the people who do its work is making a moral claim in the plainest possible language: that a dollar which becomes a person’s wage has already done its civic duty, and a dollar merely hoarded has not.

For most of the twentieth century, the American corporate tax made exactly that claim — not as charity, but as structure. It is worth remembering how plainly it did so, because we have spent forty years pretending the arithmetic was always the other way.

The mechanism that was never complicated

A corporation is taxed on its profit — what remains after the costs of doing business are subtracted. Wages are a cost of doing business. So are health benefits. So are the contributions a company sets aside for its workers’ pensions. The tax law has long treated all three as ordinary, deductible expenses under Internal Revenue Code §162 and §4045 — money that leaves the company’s hands to land in a worker’s, and therefore money the company is not taxed on at all.

Read it slowly, because the whole argument lives here. A dollar paid to an employee passes out the door untaxed at the corporate gate. A dollar kept as profit meets the rate. From the company’s side of the ledger, the system was never indifferent between spending on people and keeping — it favored the spending. Everything that follows depends on one number we have since forgotten how to say out loud.

§01   The Forgotten Number

When More Than Half of a Kept Dollar Was Owed

That number was the rate. Through the Eisenhower years and deep into the 1960s, the top federal tax on corporate profit sat at about fifty-two percent — it touched 52.8 percent in 1968 and 1969, the highest it has ever stood.1,4 Sit with what a rate like that does to the arithmetic above.

52–53%
Top corporate rate through most of the 1950s and 1960s.1,4
§162 / §404
The code sections that make wages, benefits & pensions fully deductible.5
≈49%
Share of profits the average corporation actually paid in tax in the 1950s.3

When more than half of every retained dollar is owed to the public, keeping a dollar is expensive. Spending it — on a raise, a wider benefit, a more generous pension, reinvestment in the work itself — is, by comparison, cheap. The code did not order a company to be good to its people. It arranged the conditions so that being good to its people was the path of least resistance.

The top statutory corporate rate fell in steps from about 52% at midcentury to 21% today. The cliff at 1986–87 marks the Reagan-era reforms; the rate has not approached its postwar level since. Source: Tax Foundation; Tax Policy Center.1,2

This is the principle worth carrying out of these pages, because it outlasts any single statute: the state cannot be ordered; the conditions can be prepared. A high rate on hoarded profit is not a punishment. It is a gradient — it tilts the floor, gently and continuously, toward the worker.

The era went further than the gradient, too. It wrote explicit invitations into the law — a Work Incentive credit in 1971, a broad New Jobs Tax Credit in 1977, a Targeted Jobs Tax Credit in 19787,8 — each an attempt to pay employers, directly, for hiring. We should be honest that these instruments were clumsy; later audits found that roughly nine in ten of the workers they subsidized would have been hired anyway.8 But notice the instinct, even where the execution faltered: the code was reaching, however awkwardly, toward labor.

A high rate on hoarded profit is not a punishment. It is a gradient — it tilts the floor, continuously, toward the worker. Orion Quin
§02   The Turn, 1981

The Code Changed What It Loved

Then the direction changed. In 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act rebuilt the corporate side of the code around a different affection: it let companies write off the cost of machines and buildings far faster than before, enriched the credit for capital investment, and began phasing the top rate down from forty-six percent toward thirty-four.9 The code’s enthusiasm had moved — toward plant and equipment, toward the machine rather than the wage.

What the code chose to reward, by decade

YearMeasureWhat it didTilted toward
1962Investment Tax CreditA new credit for buying equipment and machineryCAPITAL
1971Work Incentive (WIN) creditPaid employers to hire people off public assistanceLABOR
1974ERISARegularized and protected deductible pension fundingLABOR
1977New Jobs Tax CreditA broad credit for expanding payrollLABOR
1978Targeted Jobs Tax CreditPaid employers to hire the hard-to-employLABOR
1981ERTAAccelerated write-offs (ACRS); larger investment credit; rate 46% → 34% phase-inCAPITAL
1986Tax Reform ActRepealed the investment credit; top rate cut to 34%MIXED
2017Tax Cuts & Jobs ActTop rate cut 35% → 21%, its lowest since the 1930sCAPITAL

Sources: Joint Committee on Taxation; Tax Notes; Congress.gov; Tax Foundation.7,9,10,11

And here is the quiet part, the part that rarely makes the headline. When you lower the rate, you do not only cut the tax on profit. You also lower the value of every deduction — including the deduction for a worker’s wage, her benefits, her pension. A wage written off against a fifty-two percent rate shelters far more than the same wage written off against thirty-four, or against the twenty-one percent rate we live under now. As the rate fell, the cost of keeping a dollar fell with it. Hoarding got cheaper. The gradient that had tilted the floor toward the worker was, degree by degree, leveled.

The weight did not vanish — it moved. As the corporate share of federal revenue fell from about 28¢ to 10¢ of every dollar, the payroll tax paid by workers rose to carry roughly 40¢. Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; OMB historical tables.3

The numbers record the leveling without sentiment. Measured against the size of the economy, corporate tax fell from near five percent of national output at midcentury to under two percent today.3 And the share of its profits that a corporation actually hands over — the effective rate, after every deduction and credit — fell with it.

The average corporation paid roughly half its profits in federal tax in the 1950s. By 2018, large and profitable corporations paid about 9%. Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; CBO/GAO analyses.3,11
§03   The Cost That Does Not Disappear

A Person’s Needs Are Fixed

Now we can say the obvious thing the whole letter has been walking toward. The cost of a person is not optional. A worker still falls ill. Still grows old. Still has to eat, and house herself, and raise whatever children she has. These needs are fixed; they do not soften because a company has declined to meet them. So when an employer pays too little to live on, offers no coverage, funds no pension, the bill does not disappear. It is simply handed to someone else.

When the firm pays

Wages, health coverage, a pension — all deductible, all sitting with the enterprise that profits from the work. The cost is internalized, exactly where it was created. — IRC §162, §404

When the firm does not

The need is still real. It lands on Medicaid, on food assistance, on the Earned Income Tax Credit, on public provision for old age. The public quietly pays part of the wage. — GAO-21-45

Either way, someone carries it

This is not an accusation; it is an accounting identity. A cost the enterprise sets down is a cost the public picks up. The only thing a society decides is whose ledger it lands on — the firm that profits from the person’s work, or everyone else.

10.4M
Full-time workers enrolled in Medicaid (5.7M) or SNAP (4.7M) in a single recent year.12
≈70%
Of working-age Medicaid and food-aid recipients who hold jobs — most full-time.12
48.4%
Of Amazon’s Nevada workforce enrolled in Medicaid in 2024.14

When the Government Accountability Office was asked to count, it found millions of full-time workers enrolled in Medicaid and food-assistance programs in a single year — and found, again and again, the largest and most profitable employers near the top of the rolls.12,14 The public was paying part of their compensation. So the question that titles this letter is neither rhetorical nor radical: Who pays for a person? Someone always does.

§04   The Invoice, Not the Lecture

What a Fair Tax Actually Is

This is why a fair tax is not the lecture we imagine it to be. We picture taxation as the state wagging a finger at the corporation, demanding it be more virtuous. The older logic was humbler and more honest than that. It did not ask the company to have values. It built a code in which valuing people was the cheaper path — and then, when a company chose otherwise, when it kept the dollar instead of paying it out, it asked that company to help fund the public systems that would catch what it had let fall.

Read that way, a higher tax on hoarded corporate profit is not a penalty at all. It is an invoice. It is the public, calmly, presenting the bill for a cost the company chose to externalize — the Medicaid it triggered, the food assistance it made necessary, the old age it left unfunded. There is nothing punitive in asking the party that created a cost to pay for it. We call that fairness in every other corner of life. We should be able to call it fairness here.

Someone always pays. A tax system is only the mechanism by which a society decides whether it is the enterprise that profited, or everyone else. Orion Quin
§05   The Honest Counterweight

Holding the Objections Rather Than Waving Them Off

None of this is beyond argument, and a meditative mind should hold the arguments rather than dismiss them.

The three serious objections

Who really bears the tax. Economists genuinely disagree about the incidence of the corporate tax; some of its weight may fall on workers through lower wages, or on customers through higher prices, not only on shareholders. The honest answer is that the burden is shared and contested.

The jobs credits failed. As we saw, the targeted credits of the 1970s mostly paid for hiring that would have happened anyway.8 Good instinct, poor instrument.

The growth case. The architects of the 1981 turn were not villains. They believed, with conviction, that lower rates and faster write-offs would grow the whole economy, lift investment, and keep capital from fleeing abroad. Those are serious claims, and the evidence on them is mixed rather than settled.

But grant every one of them, and the floor of the argument does not move. The cost of a person is still real. It still has to be carried. A tax system is, among other things, the mechanism by which a society decides who carries it. That decision is unavoidable. Only our honesty about having made it is optional.

§06   An Alternative

A Plan You Can Build From

Diagnosis without a remedy is just elegant despair. So here is the alternative — not a fantasy of confiscation, but a return to the arithmetic we abandoned, written as planks a legislator could turn into a bill. The aim is plain: rebuild the gradient that rewards spending on people, ask the firms that externalize their costs to help carry them, and use the proceeds to bend the deficit downward and widen the middle class at the same time.

The National Report Card

Grade the system we have, then ask what the plan in these pages would earn instead. These marks are judgments, not measurements — but they are honest ones.

Where it standsNowUnder the planGrade
Corporate share of federal revenue~10¢ of every dollar3~14–16¢, near the OECD norm15D
Effective rate on big, profitable firms~9%11~20%+, after a real minimum taxD−
Who carries the federal loadPayroll — the worker — ~40%3Rebalanced toward capitalD
Incentive to pay, insure, and pension workersWeak — a low rate cheapens the wage deductionRestored, plus a wage-linked rateC−
Child poverty12.4% — more than double its 2021 low17Halved, as it was in 2021F
Workers with an ownership stakeRare — a small minority of firms19The encouraged defaultC
Deficit trajectory$1.8T/yr; debt ~$38T; interest > defense18A ~$2.5–3T/decade down paymentD

The Provisions

Each plank carries a tag for where it lives and what to do with it: Federal State the level that can act; Legislate Own the lever — pass a law, or put a stake directly in people’s hands.

01

Restore a graduated corporate rate, topping out near 28%. Move halfway back to the pre-2017 rate, and bring back real brackets so a corner bakery does not pay the same rate as a trillion-dollar platform.

What it means — Raises roughly $1–1.4 trillion over a decade,15 and — more quietly — re-steepens the gradient that makes a raise cheaper than a hoard.

Federal Legislate
02

Tie the rate to the worker — a Patriot Rate. A lower effective rate for firms that pay a living wage, fund retirement, and share profits; a higher one for those that do none of it. This is not novel; it is the deductibility logic of §162 and §404, made deliberate again.

What it means — The code stops being neutral between a company that builds its people and one that strips them. It chooses, on purpose, the way it once did by accident.

Federal Legislate
03

A “pay-your-workers” surcharge on giant low-wage employers. The very largest firms whose full-time workers rely on Medicaid or food aid pay a fee scaled to the public benefits their wages trigger — the externality of §03, internalized.

What it means — By design, the revenue falls toward zero as wages rise. The point was never the fee. The point is the wage.

Federal Legislate
04

Make hoarding cost more than building: a real minimum tax and a real buyback excise. Raise the 15% tax on the book profits of billion-dollar firms toward 21%, and quadruple the stock-buyback excise from 1% to 4%.

What it means — Roughly $450 billion over a decade.16 Buybacks topped $1 trillion in 2025;16 when a firm has cash beyond its ideas, the code should not reward shipping it to shareholders over investing in the work.

Federal Legislate
05

Close the loopholes and end the race to the bottom. Trim the roughly $188 billion a year the Treasury forgoes in corporate tax breaks, and finish the global minimum tax so profits cannot flee to havens the moment the rate rises.

What it means — About $1 trillion over a decade,11,15 and a broad base — which is the only honest way to keep the rate moderate.

Federal Legislate
06

Hand the worker a stake: make employee ownership the easy default. A standing credit for converting to employee ownership, and a clear on-ramp for ESOPs and broad profit-sharing. Ownership beats bureaucracy: a share, not another agency.

What it means — Workers who own where they work hold about 92% more household wealth, earn roughly a third more, and stay 53% longer.20 It is the deepest form of “spending on people” the code can encourage.

Federal State Own
Four scoreable planks raise on the order of $2.5–3 trillion over a decade — close to the Treasury’s own “fair share” estimate — before counting a dollar of the public-assistance savings that come when wages rise. Source: Treasury; Tax Foundation; Joint Committee on Taxation; CBPP.15,16

The honest ledger

None of this is free of trade-offs, and the meditative mind named them already in §05. A higher rate would, by some estimates, modestly trim investment and GDP, and a share of the cost falls on workers, not only shareholders — the Joint Committee on Taxation assigns about a quarter of the corporate tax to labor over the long run.16 And $2.5–3 trillion is a down payment on a deficit that runs $1.8 trillion a year, not a cure. The claim here is narrower and sturdier: this is more revenue, more fairly raised, pointed at the right problem — and paired with the wage gains, it costs the public far less than the status quo it replaces.

§07   What It Buys for People

Deficit Down, Middle Up

Revenue is only the means. The question that decides whether a plan is worth passing is the older one: does it make a person’s life better, and does it widen the middle that a country stands on? Split the proceeds, and the answer is yes on both counts — deficit reduction with one hand, a broader middle class with the other.

The family

Restore the 2021 Child Tax Credit. In its one full year it cut child poverty to a record 5.2% and lifted 2.1 million children out of poverty; when it lapsed, child poverty more than doubled to 12.4%. — Census; JEC17

The worker

The wage-linked rate and the “pay-your-workers” surcharge make a living wage, health coverage, and a funded pension the cheaper path for the employer — the same gradient that built the postwar middle class. — §01–§03

The middle class

An ownership stake turns a paycheck into wealth. Employee-owners hold about 92% more household wealth and roughly double the retirement savings of comparable workers. — NCEO20

The country

A ~$2.5–3 trillion down payment on a $1.8 trillion deficit, with interest now the size of the entire defense budget. Not the whole answer — a serious, fairly-raised start. — CBO; Treasury18

The through-line

Every dollar this plan raises by taxing hoarded profit, it can spend twice: once to shrink the deficit, and once to restore the credits and the ownership that let an ordinary family build something. That is not redistribution for its own sake. It is the country re-deciding who it is rich for.

5.2%
Record-low child poverty in 2021 under the expanded Child Tax Credit — halved in a single year.17
+92%
Higher median household wealth for workers who own a stake in their firm.20
$1T+
Annual interest on the debt — now larger than the defense budget; the case for revenue, fairly raised.18

This is the shape of the alternative. Not a heavier hand on the economy, but a wiser one — a code that once again makes building people the cheaper choice, asks the firms that lean on the public to pay their share of the lean, and turns the proceeds into a smaller deficit and a bigger middle at the same time. It is the postwar bargain, read back into a century that forgot it.

§08   The Charge

The Ledger, and Its Conscience

So we return to the ledger we began with, and to the small lie of convenience — that it is merely technical, a thermostat, nothing to believe in. It was never that.

A code that taxed what was hoarded and spared what was spent on people was making a claim about what a dollar is for. The claim was not loud. It did not need to be. It worked the way water works on stone — drop by drop, quietly rewarding one thing over another until the shape of a whole economy had been worn into a certain form.

• • •

We changed the claim. We are allowed to change it back. The state cannot be ordered to care for the people who do its work — but the conditions can be prepared, patiently, so that caring for them is once again the natural thing, and so that when an enterprise will not, the public it leans on is at least paid back. That is not a revolution. It is only arithmetic, with its conscience restored.

We are not a poor country, and we never asked our companies to be saints. We only asked that the cost of a human being land on the ledger of the enterprise that profits from her — and called it fair when it did. In the tradition of Mike Quin · San Francisco
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Published by Dangerous Thoughts  ·  dangerousthoughts.org
Written under the pen name Orion Quin  ·  No. 03 in the Series  ·  June 2026
Free to republish in the spirit of the common reader

Sources

  1. Tax Foundation, “Historical U.S. Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates & Brackets, 1909–2020”; Tax Policy Center, Historical Corporate Top Tax Rate & Bracket — top rate ~52–53% in the 1950s–60s, peaking at 52.8% in 1968–69; 48% for much of the 1970s; 46% in the early 1980s.
  2. Tax Foundation report on the corporate income tax since WWII, via Tax Notes — Revenue Acts of 1950–51 raised the top rate to 52%; the excess-profits tax; the introduction of the investment tax credit (1962).
  3. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “The Decline of Corporate Income Tax Revenues” (2003) — corporate share of federal revenue ~28% (1950s) → ~10% since the 1980s; effective rates ~49% (1950s), 38% (1960s), 33% (1970s), 25% (1990s); corporate tax ~5% → ~1–2% of GDP; payroll tax ~10% of receipts (1952) → ~40% (2003); citing Joseph Pechman on ACRS breaking with prior law.
  4. Economic Policy Institute, “Corporate tax rates and economic growth since 1947” — statutory rate leveling at ~52–53%; before- and after-tax corporate profits at postwar highs.
  5. Internal Revenue Code §162 (trade or business expenses) and §404 (employer contributions to pension and profit-sharing plans), via Cornell Legal Information Institute; Urban Institute, “Pensions, Tax Treatment” — wages, benefits, and pension contributions are deductible business expenses.
  6. PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries, “United States — Corporate Deductions”; U.S. Chamber of Commerce — deductibility of employee compensation and retirement contributions.
  7. Joint Committee on Taxation, “Background on Tax Incentives for Employment” (1981); Tax Policy Center, “New Jobs Tax Credit” — Work Incentive (WIN) credit (1971); New Jobs Tax Credit (1977).
  8. U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, “Targeted Jobs Tax Credit” (1994); Urban Institute (Hamersma) — TJTC (1978–1994); ~92% of subsidized workers would have been hired regardless.
  9. Tax Notes, “Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34)”; Congress.gov — ACRS accelerated depreciation; enlarged investment credit; top corporate rate phased from 46% to 34% by 1987.
  10. Tax Foundation, “Modeling the Economic Effects of Past Tax Bills”; Tax Reform Act of 1986 — repeal of the investment tax credit; top rate cut to 34%.
  11. Tax Foundation; CGAA, “US Corporate Tax Rate History” — Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (35% → 21%); average effective rate among large profitable corporations ~9% in 2018; ~$161B in corporate tax expenditures (2023).
  12. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-21-45, “Millions of Full-Time Workers Rely on Federal Health Care and Food Assistance Programs” (2020) — 5.7M Medicaid and 4.7M SNAP recipients worked full-time, 50+ weeks, in 2018; ~70% of working-age recipients employed; largest, most profitable employers prominent on state rolls.
  13. UC Berkeley Labor Center, “The High Public Cost of Low Wages” — working families across major public-assistance programs; savings from higher wages and employer coverage.
  14. Institute for Policy Studies / Inequality.org (S. Anderson, 2026), “Low-Wage 20” — 48.4% of Amazon’s Nevada employees enrolled in Medicaid (2024); median pay below Medicaid/SNAP thresholds at most of the 20 largest low-wage firms.
  15. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “General Explanations of the FY2025 Revenue Proposals” (Green Book, 2024); Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2026); Tax Foundation — raising the corporate rate to 28% raises ~$1.0–1.4 trillion over ten years; U.S. corporate tax is among the lowest in the OECD as a share of GDP.
  16. Joint Committee on Taxation; Congressional Research Service (R47328, R47397) — the 15% corporate alternative minimum tax (~$222B/10 yr) and the 1% stock-buyback excise (~$74B/10 yr); Treasury Green Book proposals to raise the minimum toward 21% and the buyback excise to 4%; JCT assigns ~25% of the corporate tax to labor in the long run. Buybacks (S&P 500) reached ~$942B in 2024 and topped $1 trillion in 2025.
  17. U.S. Census Bureau (2022); Joint Economic Committee; Columbia Center on Poverty & Social Policy; Urban Institute — the 2021 expanded Child Tax Credit cut child poverty to a record 5.2% (from 9.7%), lifting ~2.1 million children out of poverty; child poverty rose to 12.4% in 2022 after the expansion lapsed.
  18. Congressional Budget Office and U.S. Treasury, Monthly Budget Review / Monthly Treasury Statement, FY2025 — $1.8 trillion deficit (5.9% of GDP); net interest ~$1.0 trillion, exceeding defense; gross federal debt ~$37.6 trillion. Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget — ~$7.5 trillion of deficit reduction over a decade would stabilize debt near 3% of GDP.
  19. National Center for Employee Ownership — over 6,400 U.S. companies sponsor an ESOP; participation associated with markedly higher wealth, wages, retirement savings, and tenure.
  20. NCEO (2017; 2025 National Longitudinal Surveys analysis); ESCA/NCEO (2023–24) — ESOP participation associated with ~92% higher median household net wealth, ~33% higher median wages, 53% longer median tenure, and roughly double the median retirement balance ($80,500 vs. $30,000).