We are taught to read a tax code the way we read a thermostat — a technical thing, a dial of rates and brackets, nothing in it to believe in or to doubt. This is a small lie of convenience. The moment a society decides what counts as profit, it has decided, quietly, what it is for. A code that taxes what a company keeps and leaves untouched what it pays out to the people who do its work is making a moral claim in the plainest possible language: that a dollar which becomes a person’s wage has already done its civic duty, and a dollar merely hoarded has not.
For most of the twentieth century, the American corporate tax made exactly that claim — not as charity, but as structure. It is worth remembering how plainly it did so, because we have spent forty years pretending the arithmetic was always the other way.
A corporation is taxed on its profit — what remains after the costs of doing business are subtracted. Wages are a cost of doing business. So are health benefits. So are the contributions a company sets aside for its workers’ pensions. The tax law has long treated all three as ordinary, deductible expenses under Internal Revenue Code §162 and §4045 — money that leaves the company’s hands to land in a worker’s, and therefore money the company is not taxed on at all.
Read it slowly, because the whole argument lives here. A dollar paid to an employee passes out the door untaxed at the corporate gate. A dollar kept as profit meets the rate. From the company’s side of the ledger, the system was never indifferent between spending on people and keeping — it favored the spending. Everything that follows depends on one number we have since forgotten how to say out loud.
That number was the rate. Through the Eisenhower years and deep into the 1960s, the top federal tax on corporate profit sat at about fifty-two percent — it touched 52.8 percent in 1968 and 1969, the highest it has ever stood.1,4 Sit with what a rate like that does to the arithmetic above.
When more than half of every retained dollar is owed to the public, keeping a dollar is expensive. Spending it — on a raise, a wider benefit, a more generous pension, reinvestment in the work itself — is, by comparison, cheap. The code did not order a company to be good to its people. It arranged the conditions so that being good to its people was the path of least resistance.
This is the principle worth carrying out of these pages, because it outlasts any single statute: the state cannot be ordered; the conditions can be prepared. A high rate on hoarded profit is not a punishment. It is a gradient — it tilts the floor, gently and continuously, toward the worker.
The era went further than the gradient, too. It wrote explicit invitations into the law — a Work Incentive credit in 1971, a broad New Jobs Tax Credit in 1977, a Targeted Jobs Tax Credit in 19787,8 — each an attempt to pay employers, directly, for hiring. We should be honest that these instruments were clumsy; later audits found that roughly nine in ten of the workers they subsidized would have been hired anyway.8 But notice the instinct, even where the execution faltered: the code was reaching, however awkwardly, toward labor.
Then the direction changed. In 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act rebuilt the corporate side of the code around a different affection: it let companies write off the cost of machines and buildings far faster than before, enriched the credit for capital investment, and began phasing the top rate down from forty-six percent toward thirty-four.9 The code’s enthusiasm had moved — toward plant and equipment, toward the machine rather than the wage.
| Year | Measure | What it did | Tilted toward |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1962 | Investment Tax Credit | A new credit for buying equipment and machinery | CAPITAL |
| 1971 | Work Incentive (WIN) credit | Paid employers to hire people off public assistance | LABOR |
| 1974 | ERISA | Regularized and protected deductible pension funding | LABOR |
| 1977 | New Jobs Tax Credit | A broad credit for expanding payroll | LABOR |
| 1978 | Targeted Jobs Tax Credit | Paid employers to hire the hard-to-employ | LABOR |
| 1981 | ERTA | Accelerated write-offs (ACRS); larger investment credit; rate 46% → 34% phase-in | CAPITAL |
| 1986 | Tax Reform Act | Repealed the investment credit; top rate cut to 34% | MIXED |
| 2017 | Tax Cuts & Jobs Act | Top rate cut 35% → 21%, its lowest since the 1930s | CAPITAL |
Sources: Joint Committee on Taxation; Tax Notes; Congress.gov; Tax Foundation.7,9,10,11
And here is the quiet part, the part that rarely makes the headline. When you lower the rate, you do not only cut the tax on profit. You also lower the value of every deduction — including the deduction for a worker’s wage, her benefits, her pension. A wage written off against a fifty-two percent rate shelters far more than the same wage written off against thirty-four, or against the twenty-one percent rate we live under now. As the rate fell, the cost of keeping a dollar fell with it. Hoarding got cheaper. The gradient that had tilted the floor toward the worker was, degree by degree, leveled.
A deduction is only worth the rate it is measured against. At 52%, paying a worker a dollar saved the company 52¢ in tax; the true cost of that raise was 48¢. At 21%, the same raise saves only 21¢, and costs the company 79¢. Nothing in the rule changed — wages are still fully deductible. But the incentive to convert profit into people quietly collapsed along with the rate.
The numbers record the leveling without sentiment. Measured against the size of the economy, corporate tax fell from near five percent of national output at midcentury to under two percent today.3 And the share of its profits that a corporation actually hands over — the effective rate, after every deduction and credit — fell with it.
Now we can say the obvious thing the whole letter has been walking toward. The cost of a person is not optional. A worker still falls ill. Still grows old. Still has to eat, and house herself, and raise whatever children she has. These needs are fixed; they do not soften because a company has declined to meet them. So when an employer pays too little to live on, offers no coverage, funds no pension, the bill does not disappear. It is simply handed to someone else.
Wages, health coverage, a pension — all deductible, all sitting with the enterprise that profits from the work. The cost is internalized, exactly where it was created. — IRC §162, §404
The need is still real. It lands on Medicaid, on food assistance, on the Earned Income Tax Credit, on public provision for old age. The public quietly pays part of the wage. — GAO-21-45
This is not an accusation; it is an accounting identity. A cost the enterprise sets down is a cost the public picks up. The only thing a society decides is whose ledger it lands on — the firm that profits from the person’s work, or everyone else.
When the Government Accountability Office was asked to count, it found millions of full-time workers enrolled in Medicaid and food-assistance programs in a single year — and found, again and again, the largest and most profitable employers near the top of the rolls.12,14 The public was paying part of their compensation. So the question that titles this letter is neither rhetorical nor radical: Who pays for a person? Someone always does.
This is why a fair tax is not the lecture we imagine it to be. We picture taxation as the state wagging a finger at the corporation, demanding it be more virtuous. The older logic was humbler and more honest than that. It did not ask the company to have values. It built a code in which valuing people was the cheaper path — and then, when a company chose otherwise, when it kept the dollar instead of paying it out, it asked that company to help fund the public systems that would catch what it had let fall.
Read that way, a higher tax on hoarded corporate profit is not a penalty at all. It is an invoice. It is the public, calmly, presenting the bill for a cost the company chose to externalize — the Medicaid it triggered, the food assistance it made necessary, the old age it left unfunded. There is nothing punitive in asking the party that created a cost to pay for it. We call that fairness in every other corner of life. We should be able to call it fairness here.
None of this is beyond argument, and a meditative mind should hold the arguments rather than dismiss them.
Who really bears the tax. Economists genuinely disagree about the incidence of the corporate tax; some of its weight may fall on workers through lower wages, or on customers through higher prices, not only on shareholders. The honest answer is that the burden is shared and contested.
The jobs credits failed. As we saw, the targeted credits of the 1970s mostly paid for hiring that would have happened anyway.8 Good instinct, poor instrument.
The growth case. The architects of the 1981 turn were not villains. They believed, with conviction, that lower rates and faster write-offs would grow the whole economy, lift investment, and keep capital from fleeing abroad. Those are serious claims, and the evidence on them is mixed rather than settled.
But grant every one of them, and the floor of the argument does not move. The cost of a person is still real. It still has to be carried. A tax system is, among other things, the mechanism by which a society decides who carries it. That decision is unavoidable. Only our honesty about having made it is optional.
Diagnosis without a remedy is just elegant despair. So here is the alternative — not a fantasy of confiscation, but a return to the arithmetic we abandoned, written as planks a legislator could turn into a bill. The aim is plain: rebuild the gradient that rewards spending on people, ask the firms that externalize their costs to help carry them, and use the proceeds to bend the deficit downward and widen the middle class at the same time.
Grade the system we have, then ask what the plan in these pages would earn instead. These marks are judgments, not measurements — but they are honest ones.
| Where it stands | Now | Under the plan | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate share of federal revenue | ~10¢ of every dollar3 | ~14–16¢, near the OECD norm15 | D |
| Effective rate on big, profitable firms | ~9%11 | ~20%+, after a real minimum tax | D− |
| Who carries the federal load | Payroll — the worker — ~40%3 | Rebalanced toward capital | D |
| Incentive to pay, insure, and pension workers | Weak — a low rate cheapens the wage deduction | Restored, plus a wage-linked rate | C− |
| Child poverty | 12.4% — more than double its 2021 low17 | Halved, as it was in 2021 | F |
| Workers with an ownership stake | Rare — a small minority of firms19 | The encouraged default | C |
| Deficit trajectory | $1.8T/yr; debt ~$38T; interest > defense18 | A ~$2.5–3T/decade down payment | D |
Each plank carries a tag for where it lives and what to do with it: Federal State the level that can act; Legislate Own the lever — pass a law, or put a stake directly in people’s hands.
Restore a graduated corporate rate, topping out near 28%. Move halfway back to the pre-2017 rate, and bring back real brackets so a corner bakery does not pay the same rate as a trillion-dollar platform.
What it means — Raises roughly $1–1.4 trillion over a decade,15 and — more quietly — re-steepens the gradient that makes a raise cheaper than a hoard.
Tie the rate to the worker — a Patriot Rate. A lower effective rate for firms that pay a living wage, fund retirement, and share profits; a higher one for those that do none of it. This is not novel; it is the deductibility logic of §162 and §404, made deliberate again.
What it means — The code stops being neutral between a company that builds its people and one that strips them. It chooses, on purpose, the way it once did by accident.
A “pay-your-workers” surcharge on giant low-wage employers. The very largest firms whose full-time workers rely on Medicaid or food aid pay a fee scaled to the public benefits their wages trigger — the externality of §03, internalized.
What it means — By design, the revenue falls toward zero as wages rise. The point was never the fee. The point is the wage.
Make hoarding cost more than building: a real minimum tax and a real buyback excise. Raise the 15% tax on the book profits of billion-dollar firms toward 21%, and quadruple the stock-buyback excise from 1% to 4%.
What it means — Roughly $450 billion over a decade.16 Buybacks topped $1 trillion in 2025;16 when a firm has cash beyond its ideas, the code should not reward shipping it to shareholders over investing in the work.
Close the loopholes and end the race to the bottom. Trim the roughly $188 billion a year the Treasury forgoes in corporate tax breaks, and finish the global minimum tax so profits cannot flee to havens the moment the rate rises.
What it means — About $1 trillion over a decade,11,15 and a broad base — which is the only honest way to keep the rate moderate.
Hand the worker a stake: make employee ownership the easy default. A standing credit for converting to employee ownership, and a clear on-ramp for ESOPs and broad profit-sharing. Ownership beats bureaucracy: a share, not another agency.
What it means — Workers who own where they work hold about 92% more household wealth, earn roughly a third more, and stay 53% longer.20 It is the deepest form of “spending on people” the code can encourage.
None of this is free of trade-offs, and the meditative mind named them already in §05. A higher rate would, by some estimates, modestly trim investment and GDP, and a share of the cost falls on workers, not only shareholders — the Joint Committee on Taxation assigns about a quarter of the corporate tax to labor over the long run.16 And $2.5–3 trillion is a down payment on a deficit that runs $1.8 trillion a year, not a cure. The claim here is narrower and sturdier: this is more revenue, more fairly raised, pointed at the right problem — and paired with the wage gains, it costs the public far less than the status quo it replaces.
Revenue is only the means. The question that decides whether a plan is worth passing is the older one: does it make a person’s life better, and does it widen the middle that a country stands on? Split the proceeds, and the answer is yes on both counts — deficit reduction with one hand, a broader middle class with the other.
Restore the 2021 Child Tax Credit. In its one full year it cut child poverty to a record 5.2% and lifted 2.1 million children out of poverty; when it lapsed, child poverty more than doubled to 12.4%. — Census; JEC17
The wage-linked rate and the “pay-your-workers” surcharge make a living wage, health coverage, and a funded pension the cheaper path for the employer — the same gradient that built the postwar middle class. — §01–§03
An ownership stake turns a paycheck into wealth. Employee-owners hold about 92% more household wealth and roughly double the retirement savings of comparable workers. — NCEO20
A ~$2.5–3 trillion down payment on a $1.8 trillion deficit, with interest now the size of the entire defense budget. Not the whole answer — a serious, fairly-raised start. — CBO; Treasury18
Every dollar this plan raises by taxing hoarded profit, it can spend twice: once to shrink the deficit, and once to restore the credits and the ownership that let an ordinary family build something. That is not redistribution for its own sake. It is the country re-deciding who it is rich for.
This is the shape of the alternative. Not a heavier hand on the economy, but a wiser one — a code that once again makes building people the cheaper choice, asks the firms that lean on the public to pay their share of the lean, and turns the proceeds into a smaller deficit and a bigger middle at the same time. It is the postwar bargain, read back into a century that forgot it.
So we return to the ledger we began with, and to the small lie of convenience — that it is merely technical, a thermostat, nothing to believe in. It was never that.
A code that taxed what was hoarded and spared what was spent on people was making a claim about what a dollar is for. The claim was not loud. It did not need to be. It worked the way water works on stone — drop by drop, quietly rewarding one thing over another until the shape of a whole economy had been worn into a certain form.
We changed the claim. We are allowed to change it back. The state cannot be ordered to care for the people who do its work — but the conditions can be prepared, patiently, so that caring for them is once again the natural thing, and so that when an enterprise will not, the public it leans on is at least paid back. That is not a revolution. It is only arithmetic, with its conscience restored.